Somebody is home by Lane, Timothy Joseph
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=pcgn20
Cognitive Neuropsychology
ISSN: 0264-3294 (Print) 1464-0627 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pcgn20
Somebody is home
Timothy Joseph Lane
To cite this article: Timothy Joseph Lane (2020): Somebody is home, Cognitive Neuropsychology,
DOI: 10.1080/02643294.2020.1738364
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1738364
Published online: 10 Mar 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
COMMENTARY
Somebody is home
Timothy Joseph Lane a,b,c
aGraduate Institute of Mind, Brain, and Consciousness, Taipei Medical University, Taipei, Taiwan; bBrain and Consciousness Research Center,
Taipei Medical University-Shuang Ho Hospital, New Taipei City, Taiwan; cInstitute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei,
Taiwan
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 2 December 2019; Revised 22 February 2020; Accepted 1 March 2020
KEYWORDS Attention schema; consciousness; self; unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; anterior cingulate cortex; scientiﬁc explanation
Graziano and colleagues (2019) argue that “the hard
problem of consciousness belongs fundamentally to
the same category as auras, mind beams, soul, ka,
chi, and spirit.” They begin by distinguishing
between i- and m-consciousness. The former refers
to theories that focus on how information in the
brain is selected, enhanced and processed; the latter,
associated with the hard problem, refers to theories
that take it as axiomatic that mind has mysterious,
qualia or subjective experiences.
Among empirically-based frameworks that take
neural data into account, Graziano and colleagues
believe the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) has
already made the most progress in explaining i-con-
sciousness. They attempt to show that their social cog-
nitive approach—Attention Schema Theory (AST)—
has suﬃcient conceptual resources to unify GNW
with other theories, viz. higher-order thought (HOT)
and illusionist perspectives. One purpose of uniﬁca-
tion is to explain i-consciousness while also explaining
the seductive power of m-consciousness. GNW helps
explain actual information processing; HOT helps
explain m-consciousness, because the higher-order
representation of self and the world is a simpliﬁed
schematic. It is designed to be eﬃcient, not accurate.
That it can be inaccurate but useful helps accommo-
date illusionist perspectives, which argue that subjec-
tive experience does not exist.
They focus on attention because, although it is dis-
tinguishable from consciousness, it evinces properties
that are commonly attributed to consciousness—e.g.,
both are produced by an agent, a self. But where
attention is an objectively measurable property of
the brain, the schematic model that embodies m-con-
sciousness tends to imply a suspect sense of self—an
“I” who is aware. Taking their lead from control
theory’s idea that a controller’s function is enhanced
if it includes an internal model, Graziano and col-
leagues argue that the schematic model of self is
adaptively advantageous because it provides better
control of attention, and a theory of mind that
enables modelling the attention of others. Naturally,
the attention schema that targets self diﬀers from
the schema that targets others: targeting of others is
limited to information like simple visual cues. When
our schema targets self, however, it has access to
richer sources of information and it is able to exercise
a degree of control.
But is there evidence to suggest that the sche-
matic model comprises ethereal, mysterious
elements? To support this argument, Graziano and
colleagues draw upon research which suggests that
when subjects observe a face gazing at an object,
they tend to treat the stimulus as though “an invis-
ible, gentle, mind-force were emanating from the
face and physically pushing on the object.” Subjects
do not describe events in this way. But this “ﬂuid
ﬂow” model—the idea that a ﬂuid or viscous sub-
stance generated inside selves ﬂows outward
toward targets—is conjectured to be a model, devel-
oped in evolutionary time, as a geometric trick,
helping us to navigate social life, enabling us to
monitor where and to what degree others direct
their attention. At the same time, the schematic
applied to self enables us to manage our own atten-
tional processes.
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In order to marshal support for AST, Graziano and
colleagues adduce two additional arguments: (a)
they cite experimental and clinical evidence that
suggest a possible neural substrate for the attention
schema and, (b) they suggest that AST, GNW, HOT
and illusionist views cohere. As for (a), extrapolating
from previous research, they conjecture that the atten-
tion schema is realized in virtue of neuronal activity in
a cortical network that includes regions within the
temporal parietal junction (TPJ). Brain imaging
studies suggest that when people attribute awareness
to others or when visual awareness is manipulated, a
cortical network that involves the TPJ is recruited.
What is more, damage to the right TPJ can cause the
most severe cases of hemispatial neglect, a paradig-
matic example of disrupted awareness.
As for (b), Graziano and colleagues note that AST
comprises three networks: Network A refers to the
processing of information in a neural network in
such a way that it is admitted to the brain’s GNW.
Network B constructs an attentional schema, a predic-
tive model of how A deploys attention, playing a role
analogous to HOT. Finally, Network C receives output
signals from A and B, transforming them into user-
friendly form such as speech. In sum, A contains and
uses information; B constructs the attention schema;
and, C enables the system to report the information
it contains to the outside world. But the schematically
encoded properties that are reported are constrained
by eﬃciency, not accuracy.
Combining A, B, and C produces a machine that
lacks subjective experience. Nevertheless, the
machine is busy with information in such a way that
it thinks and communicates the belief—the illusion
—that it has subjective experiences. It is thus that Gra-
ziano and colleagues provide a parsimonious way of
linking GNW, HOT, and illusionist perspectives. If this
architecture approximates the truth, since there is no
experience, the Hard Problem is dissolved.
AST comprises a bold set of conjectures, linking
scientiﬁc to philosophical concerns, while also
suggesting paths for future research. To cite just one
example, experimental support they adduce for the
idea that people act as though an ethereal ﬂuid is gen-
erated inside, one that ﬂows outward toward objects
of attention, suggests an implicit folk psychology
that may well help explain why m-consciousness is
represented by the brain as real. This line of research
seems to dovetail with investigations of religion,
especially those that suggest it is part of human
nature and unlikely to disappear from human society
(Konner, 2019). Recall that according to Graziano and
colleagues, “belief in m-consciousness… is a lingering
fragment of a larger cluster of physically incorrect
beliefs.”
The attempt to incorporate an empirically-
grounded explanation of the illusion of conscious-
ness into AST is commendable. I am, however,
dubious that AST will succeed in persuading propo-
nents of the Hard Problem. The nub of the Hard
Problem is that explaining how cognition engages
in the processing of sensory information is an Easy
Problem; so, when AST touts a cognitive function
(viz. attention), it automatically becomes a candidate
for—arguably facile—dismissal. This vulnerability is
aggravated by AST’s aspiration to treat conscious-
ness as an illusion and its conjecture that advocates
of the Hard Problem are mired in superstition. AST’s
aspirations make it vulnerable to the retort that it
ignores the datum in need of explanation and that
faith in the explanatory scope of current cognitive
neuroscience is grounded in beliefs that are no
less misguided. To move beyond this impasse, I
believe that even if AST is found to be true, it will
need to be complemented by a set of reasonable
expectations for what should be expected of scien-
tiﬁc explanation.
Chalmers posed the question (1995, p. 20): “Why is
the performance of these functions accompanied by
experience?” Now consider that in a letter to
Bentley, Newton wrote, “the cause of gravity is what
I do not pretend to know…” (Gillispie, 2017, p. 147).
The reason for juxtaposing these two quotes is to
echo what others have argued—the Hard Problem is
not speciﬁc to consciousness science. The history of
science is ﬁlled with examples of these sorts: success
in explaining some phenomena is achieved, but yet
more why-questions can be posed. Indeed, this is of
a piece with the history of rational thought (Lane,
2017): what I am suggesting is that if we discover
that the curvature of spacetime causes gravity, that
does not put an end to why-questions concerning
the nature of gravity. The point is not that Chalmers’
question is idle; it is worth asking. And it is a question
that AST can help to answer. But treating conscious-
ness as uniquely Hard has served to insulate it from
properly contextualized understanding of scientiﬁc
explanation.
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But there is another problem that is even more dis-
concerting—AST is exclusively cognitive. AST’s ambi-
tion to unify GNW, HOT and illusionist perspectives,
commits it to the position that there is no subjective
experience; there is only false but refractory belief. It
could just as easily be the case, however, that subjec-
tive experience exists in its own right, without belong-
ing to the same category as auras, souls, or spirits. The
claim is that subjective experience is not an illusion,
but neither is it aligned with m-consciousness.
How might that be so? Note that Graziano and col-
leagues reiterate the claim that “somebody is home.”
They fail, however, to articulate what this implies,
other than to say that we are misled about the nature
of self. For clariﬁcation, AST seems to lean heavily on
HOT, since AST emphasizes that higher-order thoughts
have the content, “I am aware of the stimulus,” not
merely “there is a stimulus.” HOTs then, on this view,
not only represent the dynamics and consequences
of a GNW, they also represent the self.
But to the extent that AST relies upon HOT for clar-
iﬁcation of subjective experience—the experiences of
a self—it also inherits HOT’s problem. What HOT
shares with AST is inclusion of many distortions and
inaccuracies (Lane & Liang, 2008). Unfortunately,
these inaccuracies include misrepresentation of self
(Lane, 2015), thereby leaving it unclear as regards in
what sense “somebody is home.”
I believe that if we are to make sense of “somebody
is at home,” AST will need to consider neuronal activity
that does not directly overlap with the TPJ and that
does not ﬁt comfortably into the attentional schema.
An alternative is suggested by the observation that
neuronal correlates or preconditions for self are inte-
gral to the brain’s spontaneous activity (Lane et al.,
2016): in an experimental setting it can be shown
that the brain’s spontaneous activity disposes subjects
to judge visual or auditory stimuli as self-related (Bai
et al., 2016; Qin et al., 2016). What seems to occur is
that stimuli are shaped in such a way that self is inti-
mated. And what makes this type of neuronal activity
speciﬁcally relevant to subjective experience is that
the activity is similar to what is observed in some
patients suﬀering from Disorders of Consciousness
when they hear their own name. In fact, degree of
signal change not only makes it possible to distinguish
between unresponsive wakefulness and minimal con-
sciousness, it also enables predicting the likelihood of
recovery (Qin et al., 2010).
If we allow that one’s name can serve as a proxy for
self, this and similar experimental paradigms (Huang
et al., 2014) make possible the investigation of subjec-
tive experience in a way that does not imply m-con-
sciousness. In these studies, unlike AST, a special role
is attributed to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
Indeed, the ACC also features prominently in compet-
ing theories of the relationship between self and con-
sciousness: e.g., Schiﬀ’s (2010) mesocircuit hypothesis
emphasizes the ACC’s role in “executive systems” and
GNW highlights its role in “self-monitoring” (Dehaene
et al., 2017). The diﬀerence between these two sets of
studies is that where Schiﬀ and Dehaene et al. treat
“self” as a concept that involves higher-level or meta-
cognitive activity, the other studies cited above treat
“self” as a more fundamental entity that does not
require reﬂection, perhaps not even cognition.
Which approach will gain more empirical traction
remains to be seen. But both attempt to preserve a
role for self.
Leaning into the future, in order to get clear about
AST’s explanatory adequacy, it will be necessary to
properly characterize the phenomenon in need of
explanation. I submit that, as a ﬁrst approximation,
Humphrey’s description of self captures its homey inti-
macy (2011, p. 90): “the core self (is)… the owner and
occupier of the thick moment of consciousness.” This
type of subjective experience is not ethereal; indeed,
it can be investigated by methods wholly compatible
with i-consciousness, and very likely including neural
data that concerns the role of the ACC. Graziano and
colleagues aspire to explain the feeling, “somebody
is home.” Doing so will require investigations of i-con-
sciousness that include a place for self.
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